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ABSTRACT 
 After two-and-a-half decades of labor peace in Major 
League Baseball, storm clouds of a player strike are 
brewing as the operating Competitive Bargaining 
Agreement comes under fire.  That same CBA includes 
Attachment 56, the most expansive allowance of wearable 
technology of the four major American professional sports.  
While the privacy of the athletes’ data might be the 
foremost concern under Attachment 56, there are a myriad 
of untapped arenas involving the use and dissemination of 
data from wearables, including issues in good-faith 
contracting and contract and trade negotiations.  After 
situating the wearables provisions in the context of the 
CBA and describing the approved technologies, this Note 
will identify three infrequently discussed problems in 
Attachment 56 before positing ways around these concerns. 
INTRODUCTION 
 On December 1, 2016, Major League Baseball (“MLB”) owners 
and the Major League Baseball Players Association (the “Players 
Association”) agreed to a new Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(“CBA”) for the 2017-2021 seasons.1  Just over a year later, two-time 
All-Star reliever Pat Neshek agreed to a two-year contract with the 
Philadelphia Phillies.2  Neshek was thirty-seven years old,3 about a 
																																																						
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected May 2020; Princeton 
University, A.B., June 2016. 
1 Richard Justice, Peace & Glove: Owners, Players Reach CBA Deal, MLB 
(Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.mlb.com/news/mlb-owners-players-agree-to-new-
labor-deal/c-209969472. 
2 Alec Nathan, Report: Pat Neshek, Phillies Agree to Contract After July Trade 
to Rockies, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2672426-report-pat-neshek-phillies-agree-to-
contract-after-july-trade-to-rockies. 
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decade older than the average Major League pitcher,4 and set to earn 
twice as much as the average MLB player.5  Yet it was Neshek who, on 
February 14, 2019, forecasted a grim future of labor peace in baseball, 
explicitly using the s-word: he “100 percent” expected a strike.6  “I think 
we signed a bad CBA, personally,” Neshek opined, “we’re not going to 
have baseball.”7 
 The last work stoppage in Major League Baseball occurred 
during the 1994 season; its resolution gave baseball the longest period of 
continuous labor peace across the four major American professional 
sports.8  Storm clouds are brewing in baseball, however, as player 
salaries have stagnated,9 offseason free agents are slow to sign,10 and 
teams spend proportionally less on players than ever before11––all 
despite record revenues.12  Commentators have focused on MLB’s 
																																																																																																																									
3 Pat Neshek Player Page, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-
reference.com/players/n/neshepa01.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
4 Major League Baseball Pitching Year-by-Year Averages, BASEBALL 
REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/MLB/pitch.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
5	See	Pat Neshek, SPOTRAC, https://www.spotrac.com/mlb/philadelphia-
phillies/pat-neshek-531/ (last visited May 3, 2019) (Neshek’s annual salary is 
$8.125 million); see also Ronald Blum, APNewsBreak: Average MLB Salary 
Down for 1st Time Since ’04, AP NEWS (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/cc612855378d4327969e8293c9dba050 (stating that 
the average annual salary in the MLB is $4.1 million).	
6 Gabe Lacques, MLB Players Are Ready to 'Burn the Whole System Down.' 
Here's What They Want to Avoid a Strike, USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://amp.usatoday.com/amp/2948101002.  
7 Thomas Lott, Phillies Pitcher Pat Neshek Thinks MLB's Labor Peace Is Going 
to Come to an End, SPORTING NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/us/mlb/news/mlb-news-hot-stove-pat-neshek-
were-not-going-to-have-baseball-phillies/1d2ezrdldiypb1fzc1z5nv77y3 . 
8 Id. 
9 Blum, supra note 5. 
10 Lott, supra note 7.   
11 Maury Brown, MLB Spent Less on Player Salaries Despite Record Revenues 
in 2018, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/01/11/economic-data-shows-
mlb-spent-less-on-player-salaries-compared-to-revenues-in-
2018/#62e31a4d39d7. 
12 Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues of $10.3 Billion for 2018, FORBES 
(Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/01/07/mlb-sees-
record-revenues-of-10-3-billion-for-2018/#5e6162ee5bea. 
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“broken” economics13 and how the Players Association might push for 
change in the next CBA.14  But the current MLB CBA contains the seeds 
of another problem that has received far less attention than lower salaries 
and fewer offseason transactions: the use and regulation of wearable 
technology. 
 Keeping high-performing athletes on the field has been hailed as 
the “Holy Grail” of professional sports,15 and the use of wearables 
appears to be the next step in its pursuit.16  In 2016, MLB approved the 
in-game use of specific wearable technology, or simply “wearables,” by 
players.17  Wearables are devices worn by athletes to measure, track, and 
record biometric data, ranging from heart rate to hormone levels.18  The 
most popular and commercially successful example of wearable 
technology is the Fitbit,19 but in the realm of sports, wearables become 
far more specific, more detailed, and more expensive than a wristwatch-
like device measuring calories burned during exercise.20  Despite being 
limited to only a handful of devices, MLB’s approval of wearable 
																																																						
13 See Jeff Passan, Here's Why Baseball's Economic System Might Be Broken, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 16, 2018), https://sports.yahoo.com/heres-baseballs-
economic-system-might-broken-224638354.html. 
14 See Mike Axisa, Five Ways the MLB Players Union Can Fix Baseball and Get 
Young Players More Money, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/five-ways-the-mlb-players-union-can-fix-
baseball-and-get-young-players-more-money/. 
15 Aaron Gordon, Searching for Sports' Holy Grail, VICE (Nov. 3, 2015), 
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/kbv4py/searching-for-sports-holy-grail. 
16 See Rick Maese, Moneyball 2.0: Keeping Players Healthy, WASH. POST (Aug. 
24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/moneyball-20-keeping-
players-healthy/2015/08/24/5011ac54-48e6-11e5-9f53-
d1e3ddfd0cda_story.html?utm_term=.695337efe6c1. 
17 See ASSOCIATED PRESS, APNewsBreak: MLB Approves Wearable 
Technology, USA TODAY (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2016/04/05/ap-newsbreak-mlb-
approves-wearable-technology/82660382/ (approving two devices).  A third 
device came in 2017.  See Darren Rovell, MLB Approves Device to Measure 
Biometrics of Players, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2017), 
http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/18835843/mlb-approves-field-biometric-
monitoring-device. 
18 See Barbara Osbourne, Legal and Ethical Implications of Athletes’ Biometric 
Data Collection in Professional Sport, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 37, 37–38 
(2017) (defining biometric data and wearables). 
19 FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/home.  
20 See infra Part I(b). 
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technology21 is the most expansive allowance to date, as no other league 
has permitted biometric data devices to be worn during official league 
games.22   
Understandably, Major League players and their union23 have 
expressed concerns about the collection and use of their health 
information by teams.24  The most common concern among players and 
commentators, imagining a world where teams can tell who got a good 
night’s sleep on any given day, is that rapid expansion of wearables 
threatens privacy away from work.25  While privacy might be the 
foremost concern, there are a myriad of untapped arenas involving the 
use and dissemination of data from wearables.26 
																																																						
21 2017-2021 BASIC AGREEMENT, ATTACHMENT 56—WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY, 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/b0a4c2_95883690627349e0a5203f61b93715b5.p
df [hereinafter “CBA”]. 
22 See Eric Fisher, Wearable Tech Wins Over Major League Baseball, N.Y. BUS. 
J. (Mar. 17, 2017), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2017/03/17/wearable-tech-wins-
over-major-league-baseball.html. 
23 Minor League players are not so lucky, without the same degree of union 
protection.  See Nicholas Zych, Collection and Ownership of Minor League 
Athlete Activity Biometric Data by Major League Baseball Franchises, 14 
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. 129 (2018).  Minor Leaguers were the subjects of the 
largest league performance study to date, with a device that had yet to be 
approved at the Major League level.  See Garrett Hulfish, Whoop and MLB 
Discover the Importance of Rest in Largest League Performance Study, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.digitaltrends.com/outdoors/whoop-mlb-
performance-study-results/#/1-5.  
24 See Joe Lemire, Baseball’s Union Remains Wary of Wearables, VOCATIVE 
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.vocativ.com/348033/baseballs-union-remains-
wary-of-wearables/.  
25 See Rian Watt, New Technologies Are Forcing Baseball to Balance Big Data 
with "Big Brother, VICE (Mar. 27, 2016), 
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/8qygbp/new-technologies-are-forcing-
baseball-to-balance-big-data-with-big-brother. 
26 See, e.g., Marc Tracy, With Wearable Tech Deals, New Player Data Is Up for 
Grabs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/wearable-technology-
nike-privacy-college-football.html (asking who has the rights to player data); see 
also Brian H. Lam, Athletes and their Biometric Data—Who Owns It and How It 
Can Be Used, NAT. L. REV. (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/athletes-and-their-biometric-data-who-
owns-it-and-how-it-can-be-used (exploring in part commercial use of biometric 
data); Adam Candee, Key Questions Raised by Reported MGM-AAF Sports 
Betting Deal, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 10, 2018), 
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This Note will look beyond the confines of the privacy concerns 
raised by wearable devices.  Specifically, this Note contends that data 
collection through wearable technology pursuant to Attachment 56 of the 
MLB CBA raises issues of good-faith contracting, team-player and team-
team negotiations, and working conditions under United States labor law.  
Part I provides an overview of Attachment 56 of the CBA, which covers 
in-game use of wearable technology and treatment of the data it 
generates.  The first Part sketches how the MLB CBA came about, how 
the CBA continues to protect the league from antitrust liability under the 
Sherman Act via labor law, and what the CBA contains therein.  Part II 
discusses in detail three areas threatened by Attachment 56: health 
information asymmetry in trades between teams, coercion in contract 
negotiations between players and teams, and the intentional overexertion 
of expendable athletes.  Additionally, Part II applies applicable 
background concepts in contracts and labor law to each of these three 
potential problems.  Finally, Part III posits solutions to these problems 
that the league or the Players Association might pursue. 
I. ATTACHMENT 56 OVERVIEW 
Attachment 5627 embodies the product of negotiations between 
the Players Association and league owners regarding the in-game use and 
regulation of wearable technology.28  While the text of Attachment 56 
alone can inform an analysis of the impacts of authorizing wearables, it 
is helpful to recognize this particular agreement’s place in a larger, 
negotiated framework.  This Part begins by looking at the CBA as a 
whole before diving into the language of Attachment 56 in particular.  
Next, this Part examines the handful of devices permitted through 
Attachment 56’s authority, with a particular focus on why teams or 
players would want the information gleaned from such devices. 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																									
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/23963/mgm-aaf-sports-betting-deal/ (raising 
the question of biometric data’s place in legalized sports gambling). 
27 CBA, supra note 21, at ATTACHMENT 56.  As part of the CBA, an Attachment 
contains the same legal force as the collectively bargained agreement between 
the Players Association and the league.  Although the term “Attachment” might 
sound ancillary or insignificant, Attachments make up the largest single portion 
of the CBA in both quantity and space, between Articles, Attachments, and 
Appendices. 
28 See id. 
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A. The MLB CBA 
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act29 amended the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935,30 prohibiting unions from engaging in certain 
“unfair labor practices”31 while also protecting the affirmative right of 
employees and their unions to demand, among other things, that 
employers bargain with workers collectively.32  About twenty years after 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, in 1968, the Players Association 
negotiated with baseball club owners to produce the first CBA in major 
American professional sports.33  What separates professional athletics 
from most other unionized industries, however, is that athletes engage in 
bargaining at both the collective level and the individual level.34  That is 
to say, the Players Association is “the sole and exclusive collective 
bargaining agent for all Major League Players . . . with regard to all 
terms and conditions of employment,”35 but the individual players 
themselves nevertheless retain the right to negotiate their particular 
contracts with their respective teams.36   
1. Why Have a CBA? 
The threat of antitrust liability, among other factors, has driven 
American professional sports leagues to institute players’ unions and 
CBAs.37  The goal of antitrust, roughly stated, is to foster economic 
competition, which, in turn, is rendered impossible when one firm holds 
sufficiently dominant market power or when multiple firms cooperate in 
order to maintain market power.38  Generally, a sports league is a self-
selecting and self-regulating combination of competing teams 
cooperating to create a product––professional sports––that usually 
																																																						
29 Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–97 (2018). 
30 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2018). 
31 Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). 
32 See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
PROBLEMS 98 (5th ed. 2015).  
33 History of the Major League Baseball Players Association, MLBPA, 
https://www.mlbpa.org/history.aspx (last visited May 3, 2019).  
34 See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 341 n.12 (1989). 
35 CBA, supra note 21, at art. II. 
36 See id. at arts. III–IV. 
37 See WEILER, supra note 32, at 261. 
38 See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1–2 (3d. ed. 2018). 
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dominates its market.39  By its very nature, then, this structure potentially 
implicates Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,40 which 
prohibit “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade,”41 and condemn “monopolization”42 respectively.  Section 7 of the 
Sherman Act permits private actions against potential antitrust violators 
and awards treble damages for violations. 43  In a professional sport like 
baseball, where the average MLB team is worth $1.645 billion, the 
average revenue is $315 million, and the average operating income is 
$29 million,44 antitrust liability is too costly to risk. 
Baseball, however, has an exceptional antitrust history.45  Unlike 
every other major American professional sport, baseball contains an 
antitrust exemption, dating back to Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, 
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs46 and reaffirmed 
in Toolson v. New York Yankees47 and Flood v. Kuhn.48   Nevertheless, 
the exemption has been tested frequently in court49 and in Congress,50 
and the anomaly receives its fair share of recognition for being a 
“precedential island.”51  Its purpose is to “protect MLB from antitrust 
lawsuits challenging ‘decisions made for the collective good’” by 
preemptively tipping the scale in the league’s favor.52  In the past, MLB 
has backed down from potentially anticompetitive activities when its 
																																																						
39 See WEILER, supra note 32, at 282–83.  The exception is Major League 
Soccer, which pushed a successful “single-entity defense” in Fraser v. Major 
League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).  
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018). 
41 Id. at § 1. 
42 Id. at § 2. 
43 Id. at § 15(a). 
44 Mike Ozanian, Baseball Team Values 2018, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2018/04/11/baseball-team-values-
2018/#3e070dda3fc0.  
45 See WEILER, supra note 32, at 180–215. 
46 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (holding that the activity of baseball is not interstate 
commerce under the meaning of the term for antitrust regulation). 
47 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (declining to overturn the Federal Baseball antitrust 
exemption in the context of the reserve system of team control over players). 
48 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (declining to overturn Federal Baseball once again in the 
context of the reserve clause). 
49 See, e.g., City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm'r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686 
(9th Cir. 2015). 
50 Curt Flood Act, Pub. L. 105-297, 105 Stat. 112 (1998). 
51 Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (J. 
Gorsuch, concurring). 
52 See WEILER, supra note 32, at 288. 
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antitrust immunity was threatened.53  Done properly, collective 
bargaining agreements have the power to protect league actions that 
might otherwise seem to be anticompetitive or trigger antitrust liability.54  
Therefore, part of the MLB CBA’s purpose is to serve as an additional 
protective layer shielding the league’s actions from antitrust liability 
under what is called the non-statutory labor exemption. 
There are two labor exemptions to the Sherman Act: statutory 
and non-statutory.55  The statutory labor exemption traces its origins to § 
6 of the Clayton Act, which gives labor unions a statutory exemption 
from being considered a “combination in restraint of trade.”56  The non-
statutory exemption, meanwhile, was judicially created by two 1965 
cases: Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher 
Workmen of North America v. Jewel Tea Co.57 and United Mine Workers 
of America v. Pennington.58  The non-statutory exemption protects what 
might be considered restraints of trade by terms negotiated through 
collective bargaining.59  In other words, in the face of what would 
otherwise be antitrust violations, the statutory exemption shields union 
activity and the non-statutory exemption shields agreements between 
employers and unions.60  
The case Mackey v. National Football League61 showcases the 
non-statutory labor exemption in a sports context.  At issue was the 
NFL’s so-called Rozelle Rule, which gave complete discretion to the 
Commissioner in regard to veteran free agent compensation.62  Although 
the CBA included the rule, the court concluded that the league could not 
																																																						
53 See David Schoenfield, Still 30 Teams: Contraction Timeline, ESPN (Feb. 5, 
2002), http://assets.espn.go.com/mlb/s/2002/0205/1323230.html (considering 
shrinking the number of MLB teams down to 28 by terminating the Minnesota 
Twins and Montreal Expos, Commissioner Bud Selig backed off in part due to 
legislation proposed by two Minnesota Congressmen “aimed at ending 
baseball’s federal antitrust exemption”).    
54 See WEILER, supra note 32, at 388–402. 
55 1 JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 1.03 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed.) 
(2018). 
56 Id. 
57 381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
58 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
59 See WEILER, supra note 32, at 388–402. 
60 GRAY, supra note 55. 
61 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
62 Id. at 610–11.  When a team signed a free agent player who had been under 
contract with another team in the NFL previously, the player’s new team needed 
to provide adequate compensation to the player’s old team, under the discretion 
of the League Commissioner. 
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invoke the non-statutory labor exemption.63  The court assessed the rule 
and the CBA with a three-pronged test: the non-statutory exemption 
applies and federal labor law trumps antitrust where (1) “the restraint on 
trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining 
agreement,”64 (2) “where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns 
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,”65 and (3) “where the 
agreement sought to be exempted is the product of arm’s-length 
bargaining.”66  The court found that the NFL unilaterally imposed the 
Rozelle Rule on a fledgling players association, thereby failing the third 
prong.67   
Mackey, then, clarifies the non-statutory labor exemption to 
antitrust liability by drawing a line around what subjects may be part of a 
CBA and how a CBA may be negotiated.68   
2. What Does the MLB CBA Cover? 
The MLB CBA is a veritable Frankenstein’s monster of 
topics relating to the terms and conditions of the players’ 
employment, given life so that baseball––like other leagues––can 
shelter itself from antitrust liability by placing itself under federal 
labor law.  It is a dynamic document not only because of its 
negotiated origins, but also because it responds to the changing 
world around the game.  Attachment 56, governing wearables, 
reflects the adaptation of sport and text. 
a. Textual Analysis of Attachment 56 
Attachment 56 memorializes, in nine numbered paragraphs, “the 
approval, use and implementation of ‘wearable technology.’”69  This 
section of the Note will highlight terms and phrases critical to the 
forthcoming analysis. 
Paragraph 1 defines “wearable technology” as “any equipment, 
program, software, device or attire which is designed to collect and/or 
																																																						
63 Id. at 615–16. 
64 Id. at 614. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 615–16. 
68 Id. 
69 CBA, supra note 21 at ATTACHMENT 56.  That the Attachment is a letter is by 
no means unusual for the MLB CBA.  In fact, 38 of the 56 Attachments (and 
one of the Addenda) are communications of this sort between a representative of 
the league and a representative of the Players Association.  See id. 
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analyze information or data related to a Player’s health or performance at 
any location (including on-field, off-field and/or away from the 
ballpark).”70  The paragraph then includes an exemplary list of such 
devices, including bat sensors, compression attire, and “any device . . . 
designed to measure a Player’s health, performance and/or readiness.”71 
Paragraph 2 implicitly addresses the threat of coercion regarding 
the use of wearables.72  The paragraph provides that “[a]ny use of a 
wearable technology . . . shall be wholly voluntary and Clubs must 
refrain from making any suggestion that the use of such technology is 
anything less than wholly voluntary.”73  Players will not be penalized for 
declining or discontinuing use of wearables.74 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 concern themselves with data privacy and 
access.  Paragraph 3 specifies that a player who elects to use the 
technology must receive a list of club officials who will have access to 
the data and that the team should make any data it collects available to 
the player, either through an account if the device functions with one or 
upon the player’s request.75  Paragraph 4 sets out the provisions 
regulating confidentiality and data protection: wearable data “shall not 
become a part of the Player’s medical record, and shall not be disclosed 
by a Club to any party other than those persons listed in this Paragraph 4 
without the express written consent of the Player and the Association.”76  
Players can ask to have their data deleted at any time.77 
Paragraph 5 prohibits commercial use of information acquired 
through wearable technology by the League, any team, the player, or any 
other entity or third party.78  Paragraph 6 prohibits players from wearing 
devices in games or in pre-game activities like batting practice if such 
																																																						
70 Id. at ATTACHMENT 56, para. 1. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. at para. 2. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at para. 3. 
76 Id. at para. 4.  Those persons include: “General Manager, Assistant General 
Manager, Field Manager, Team Physician, Certified Athletic Trainer, Strength 
and Conditioning Coach, Rehabilitation Coordinator and an individual hired by 
a Club to manage the use and administration of wearable technology. A Player 
may request in writing that the Club further restrict or expand the list of 
representatives who will have access to such information and data. If the Club 
does not comply with such a request, the Player may decline to use or 
discontinue his use of the wearable technology.” 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at para. 5. 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 278 
	
	 	
devices have not been approved.79  Paragraph 7 establishes the Joint 
Committee on Wearable Technology, which reviews and recommends 
new technologies to the Playing Rules Committee.80  Paragraphs 8 and 9 
concern themselves with the future impact of the Attachment, setting 
aside 45 days to review and change Attachment 56 while also specifying 
that this wearables agreement in the 2017-2021 CBA has no bearing on 
future negotiation of such use.81 
b. Approved Devices 
Since the inclusion of Attachment 56 in the CBA, MLB has 
authorized the in-game use and data sharing use of four devices and the 
pre-game or outside use of four others.82  This section will examine the 
four on-field devices closely, summarizing how each device works, the 
data it collects, and why a team or player might benefit from that 
information.83 
 
 
																																																						
79 Id. at para. 6. 
80 Id. at para. 7. 
81 Id. at para. 8–9. 
82 See Stephanie Springer, An Update on Wearable Baseball Technology, 
HARDBALL TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://tht.fangraphs.com/an-update-on-
wearable-technology/.  
83 Pursuant to Attachment 56, four bat-related devices were approved for pre-
game activities but not for in-game use.  See id. (“Interestingly, although the 
CBA does not apply to the minor leagues, Attachment 56 of the CBA specifies 
that the Blast Motion external bat sensor can be used for swing tracking in-game 
at all minor league levels, with the Blast Motion embedded bat sensor approved 
for in-game use in complex leagues.”).  The technology consists of “external and 
embedded electronic bat sensors from Blast Motion and Diamond Kinetics used 
to track swings.”  Id.  However, in addition to not being “wearables” in the 
traditional sense, the bat devices do not provide much more information than 
can already be assessed by external means, such as bat-tracking cameras and 
software.  See id.  Regardless of how the data are acquired, metrics such as exit 
velocity and launch angle revolutionized baseball in recent years, and the 
approved bat devices are additional ways to reach what have become valuable 
predictive measures of offensive success.  For exit velocity, see Exit Velocity 
(EV), MLB, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/statcast/exit-velocity (last visited Sept. 
21, 2019).  For launch angle, see Launch Angle (LA), MLB, 
http://m.mlb.com/glossary/statcast/launch-angle (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).  
For an example of using these data to inform player assessments, see J.J. 
Cooper, Victor Robles' Exit Velocity Is Cause for Concern, BASEBALL AM. (Feb. 
6, 2019), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/victor-robles-exit-velocity-
is-cause-for-concern/.  
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i. The motusTHROW Sleeve 
One of the first two devices approved was the motusTHROW, 84 
or simply the “Motus Sleeve.”  The device is a compression sleeve that a 
player, usually a pitcher, wears on his throwing elbow.85  Inside the 
sleeve is a sensor that weighs roughly as much as a quarter and contains 
an accelerometer and gyroscope.86  The sensor measures a player’s 
precise movements and quantifies stress placed on the elbow during 
throws, monitors fatigue from a pitcher’s workload, and can detect subtle 
changes in release point or arm angle.87  The data are transmitted to an 
iPad interface, which could be viewed in real-time were it not for MLB’s 
policy against instant transmission during games.88 
Motus’s CEO Joe Nolan stated that the goal of the Motus Sleeve 
is to reduce elbow injuries in the wake of the Tommy John surgery 
“epidemic.”89  In this regard, players and teams alike can benefit from 
the biometric information collected by the device.90  The Motus Sleeve 
has seen in-game use on the elbows of players like New York Yankees 
reliever Dellin Betances, who underwent Tommy John surgery in 2009.91   
 
 
 
 
																																																						
84 MOTUS, https://www.motusglobal.com/motusbaseball (last visited Sept. 21, 
2019). 
85 Tim Moynihan, A Tiny Sensor Could Help End the MLB’s Epidemic of Elbow 
Injuries, WIRED (Jun. 4, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/motus-pro-
sensor-baseball-mlb/.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.  “Tommy John surgery,” or TJS, is shorthand for a surgical procedure in 
which the ulnar collateral ligament in usually a pitcher’s throwing elbow is 
replaced.  See Chris Landers, Just Who Is Tommy John, and Why Does Everyone 
Talk About His Surgery All the Time?, CUT4 (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.mlb.com/cut4/why-is-it-called-tommy-john-surgery.  The surgery 
was named after the first pitcher to undergo the procedure, left-handed Tommy 
John, in 1974.  See id.  John, like many other pitchers who have since had 
surgery on his ulnar collateral ligament, returned to baseball and had his career 
extended, although a full recovery is not a guarantee.  See id. 
90 Moynihan, supra note 85. 
91 Id. 
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ii. The Zephyr Bioharness 
The Zephyr Bioharness is a compression-wear undershirt that 
features a “physiological monitoring module” at its center.92  The device 
records six inputs: ECG, respiration, estimated core body temperature, 
accelerometry, time, and location.93  Taken together, these variables can 
report and display biometric markers for fatigue, calorie expenditure, 
intensity, load, and athlete readiness.94  Additionally, Zephyr software 
allows for data monitoring and collection of data on large groups of 
subjects at once, with data exportable to software such as MatLab.95 
While the Motus Sleeve was designed particularly to respond to 
and limit elbow injuries, the Zephyr Bioharness is more general in its 
application, having seen use across a number of collegiate and 
professional sports.96  During Spring Training in 2016, before the 
device’s use was sanctioned in Attachment 56, roughly one third of the 
Pittsburgh Pirates tracked their health and fitness with the device.97  
Their use of the Zephyr Bioharness was not to protect themselves from a 
specific type of injury, but rather to keep themselves on the field and 
performing at their highest levels.98  Such information would be 
instructive for managers deciding when to rest players, for front office 
analysts when assessing data such as batted ball exit velocity, and for 
players themselves when training.99 
 
																																																						
92 MEDTRONIC, ZEPHYR PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS, 
https://www.zephyranywhere.com/users/sports (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).  The 
module, as the company calls it, is reminiscent of Tony Stark’s arc reactor from 
Marvel’s Iron Man movies and comics.  See Ben Lindbergh, Iron Men: 
Quantifying the Pittsburgh Pirates’ Remarkable Injury Edge, GRANTLAND 
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/pittsburgh-pirates-healthy-
season-playoff-chances-future-impact/;  see also IRON MAN (Paramount Pictures 
2008); THE AVENGERS (Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures 2012). 
93 Victory Begins with How You Train, MEDTRONIC, 
https://www.medtronic.com/content/dam/covidien/library/us/en/product/health-
informatics-and-monitoring/zephyr-performance-systems-sports-brochure.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2019). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Travis Sawchik, Plethora of New Tools Shows Analytics’ Growth in MLB, 
TRIBLIVE (Mar. 26, 2016), https://archive.triblive.com/sports/pirates/plethora-
of-new-tools-shows-analytics-growth-in-mlb/. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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iii. The Catapult OptimEye S5 
Among the most recent devices approved for in-game use is the 
Catapult OptimEye S5,100 or the “Catapult Harness.”  The device, 
described simply as a “GPS Tracker” by MLB,101 is an pullover harness 
with a sensor in the middle of the athlete’s shoulder blades, equipped 
with a GPS locator, accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer.102  
These components measure “the lean, the turn and the force of the 
body,”103 which apply to hitting, pitching, and fielding alike.104  Catapult 
has succeeded in soccer, football, and basketball with other wearable 
products, but the Harness is its first foray into baseball.105 
Catapult’s director of business operations, Ryan Warkins, admits 
that the Catapult Harness is still in its “data collection and discovery 
phase.”106  For that reason, and for the want of professional baseball 
players publicly using the Harness, there is less to say about the utility of 
the device for teams and players.107  Nevertheless, the cross of biometric 
data and machine learning is exciting.108  The expectation is that, because 
the Catapult Harness identifies patterns of maximum effort and 
explosiveness, teams will look for players to reach past benchmarks 
before permitting them to return from injury.109  As with Motus, the 
company hopes to move from reporting live data to identifying warning 
signs for injuries, especially elbow injuries, in advance.110 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
100 CATAPULT WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY, 
https://www.catapultsports.com/products (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
101 Springer, supra note 82. 
102	Joe Lemire, Catapult Harnesses AI to Help Solve Baseball’s Injury Problems, 
SPORTTECHIE (July 19, 2017), https://www.sporttechie.com/catapult-harnesses-
ai-help-solve-baseballs-injury-problems/.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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iv. The WHOOP Strap 
Rounding out the list of approved in-game devices is the 
WHOOP Strap.111  Most akin to the popular FitBit, the WHOOP Strap is 
worn on the wrist and measures strain, recovery, and sleep through six 
separate sensors.112  The company’s goal is to optimize the wearer’s 
performance by focusing on recovery and encouraging the wristband’s 
user to respond accordingly.113  WHOOP was approved after a case study 
in the Minors in which players wore the device continuously.114 
Unlike the devices summarized thus far, the WHOOP Strap is 
meant for all-day wear, through periods of activity and inactivity alike.115  
To alleviate privacy concerns, players may select through WHOOP’s 
security settings the data they wish to share.116  That said, WHOOP’s off-
field data collection stands out compared to the company’s peers.  The 
company has already studied the effects of travel and sleep deprivation 
on player performance.117  Front office staff could, for instance, inform 
the manager that Player X stayed up all night during an off day and 
should be benched for a game.  Players who wear the device might, as 
WHOOP intends, adapt their habits to the data, prioritizing a good 
night’s sleep and making other similar choices in order to maximize their 
production.118 
II. ATTACHMENT 56’S THREATS TO PLAYERS AND TEAMS 
This Note now examines three potential problems from 
Attachment 56 currently flying under the radar, along with applicable 
legal standards for assessing them.  First, Attachment 56’s confidentiality 
provisions create an information asymmetry problem in the context of 
trades between teams.  Second, clubs may wield Attachment 56 in 
individual player contract negotiations, both for free agents and for 
players negotiating extensions.  Third, few protections exist to prevent 
teams from taking advantage of ballplayers who have already forfeited 
																																																						
111 WHOOP, https://www.whoop.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
112 WHOOP on MLB Network (video), WHOOP, https://www.whoop.com (last 
visited Sept 21, 2019). 
113 Id. 
114 See id;  see also Billy Steele, Major League Baseball Approves Another 
Wearable for In-Game Use, ENGADGET (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.engadget.com/2017/03/06/major-league-baseball-whoop-wearable-
in-game-use/; Zych, supra note 23. 
115 See Steele, supra note 114.  
116 Id. 
117 WHOOP, https://www.whoop.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
118 Id. 
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their biometric data, risking their long-term health in order to maximize 
short-term effectiveness. 
A. Trades of Players Between Teams 
Before diving into any hypotheticals about player-team 
agreements, it is necessary to provide some background about MLB 
contracts.  Attachment 56 contemplates a player agreeing with his club to 
use wearable technologies and share biometric information obtained by 
them.119  Accordingly, the arrangement of this agreement would be a 
team-offeror extending an offer “that creates a power of acceptance” in 
the player-offeree.120  With consideration, the agreement to use and share 
data from wearables becomes a legally enforceable contract.121  This 
contract could—but need not—be memorialized in a separate written 
document.122  However, a team and a player might choose instead to 
include a deal to use wearables authorized under the CBA as part of a 
more comprehensive agreement: the Uniform Player’s Contract 
(“UPC”).123 
The UPC is the baseline contract for all Major League players 
currently rostered.124  The document specifies both the agreed-upon term 
of the contract and the player’s semi-monthly salary.125  The provisions 
that follow are a hodge-podge of the player’s duties to his team,126 the 
obligations of the club to the player,127 the grounds and procedure for 
termination,128 and the league rules and regulations included by 
reference.129   
																																																						
119 See CBA, supra note 21, at ATTACHMENT 56.  
120 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR. & TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK 
EDITION § 1.05 (Matthew Bender 2017). 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 CBA, supra note 21, at APPENDIX A.  
124 See Cork Gaines, Take a Close Look at an Actual Major League Baseball 
Contract, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2011), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/uniform-major-league-baseball-contract-2011-
4.  
125 See CBA, supra note 21, at appx. A.  
126 See id.  For example, the player commits “to conform to high standards of 
personal conduct, fair play and good sportsmanship.”  See id. at sec. 3.(a).  The 
player also covenants not to participate in professional boxing while under 
contract.  See id. at sec. 5.(b).   
127 See, e.g., id. at sec. 6.(e). 
128 See id. at sec. 7. 
129 See id. at secs. 8–9. 
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The final section of the UPC is titled “Special Covenants” and is 
where, for example, one might locate deferred payment plans more 
complicated than the UPC’s contract length and semi-monthly pay 
schedule default.130  The lines under the title of the section are blank, 
giving the player and club a certain measure of flexibility when crafting 
this section.131  If player and team agreed to locate their bargain 
regarding wearable technology in the player’s individual contract using 
the UPC base, then they have the ability to enshrine the terms here.  In 
fact, logistically, it might be simplest to record a wearables agreement 
here in the UPC; the Supplemental Agreements section just prior to 
Special Covenants states that the parties “agree that no other 
understandings or agreements, whether heretofore or hereafter made, 
shall be valid, recognizable, or of any effect whatsoever, unless expressly 
set forth in a new or supplemental contract executed by the Player and 
the Club . . . and complying with the Major League Rules.”  Thus, not 
only could a player and team agree about biometric data in the UPC, but 
it might be more convenient for them to do so rather than to arrange a 
separate agreement exclusively for wearables. 
Besides these UPC fundamentals, there is one additional 
provision that is important for the following example.  Section 6(b) of 
the UPC governs the player’s disclosure obligations with regard to his 
medical information.132  Section 6(b)(1) grants the club access to all 
relevant medical information when the player consults the team 
physician or any other physician or medical professional.133  The club is 
prohibited from re-disclosing that information to anyone without the 
player’s written consent.134  Section 6(b)(2), meanwhile, offers an 
exception to this general rule against the disclosure of health 
information, allowing for the team to provide the physician’s records of 
the player to another team in the event of a contemplated trade or 
assignment, provided that there is no further re-disclosure without the 
player’s written consent.135  The illustration to follow is a Section 6(b)(2) 
situation in which a player is traded between teams. 
																																																						
130 See id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at sec. 6.(b). 
133 Id. at sec. 6.(b)(1). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at sec. 6.(b)(2). 
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In November 2018, the New York Yankees traded three 
prospects to the Seattle Mariners for starting pitcher James Paxton.136  
Paxton was arguably the best starting pitcher traded in the 2018-2019 
offseason, with only his spotty injury track record diminishing his 
profile.137  Of course, because of the health disclosure requirements in 
the UPC under Section 6(b)(2), the Yankees would have known about 
any medical risks Paxton may have had before following through with 
the trade.138  But, due to the privacy protections afforded by Paragraph 4 
of Attachment 56,139 New York might not have had the full picture. 
During his time in Seattle, Paxton became a devotee of the 
Motus Sleeve, wearing it on his throwing arm when tossing between 
starts but not in-game.140  The Mariners, who encouraged widespread use 
of wearable technology in their organization, had access to and reviewed 
the data it collected.141  Paxton would miss time in 2019, but for an 
unrelated knee injury rather than for any issue a Motus Sleeve might 
unearth.142  Nevertheless, this example illustrates the information 
asymmetry problem created by Attachment 56’s confidentiality 
provisions.  If one team has a player who agrees to wearing a device 
gathering biometric data, they have undiscoverable information that 
grants them leverage in trade talks.  In every trade, a dealer knows her 
hand better than that of her adversary, but in a world of ubiquitous 
scouting, limitless analytical tools, and readily available health records, 
this information asymmetry barrier is falling.  Attachment 56 lets data-
collecting teams hide the ball, so to speak, by blocking the exchange of 
																																																						
136Yankees Land James Paxton in Trade, Send Top Prospect to Mariners, ESPN 
(Nov. 20, 2018), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/25325582/yankees-land-
james-paxton-trade-send-top-prospect-mariners.  
137 See id. (“Paxton is 41-26 in six major league seasons, making six trips to the 
disabled list in the past five years. He missed nearly four months with a strained 
left latissimus dorsi muscle in 2014, 3½ months with a strained tendon in his left 
middle finger in 2015, 10 days with a bruised left elbow in 2016, 3½ weeks with 
a strained left forearm and a month with a strained left pectoral muscle in 2017, 
and 2½ weeks with lower back inflammation this year.”). 
138 See CBA, supra note 21, at appx. A, sec. 6.(b)(2). 
139 See id. at ATTACHMENT 56, para. 4. 
140 See Joe Lemire, Seattle Mariners Embrace Data, Tech like Rapsodo, K-
Motion, Motus, TrackMan, SPORTTECHIE (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.sporttechie.com/seattle-mariners-james-paxton-analytics-rapsodo-
kmotion-motus-trackman/.   
141 See id. 
142 See Bob Klapisch, The Yankees’ James Paxton Has a Sore Left Knee, and a 
Theory as to Why, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/sports/james-paxton-yankees.html.   
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health-related information potentially indicative of long-term 
productivity and performance. 
B. Free Agents and Contract Extensions 
Turning to the players, agreement to Attachment 56 biometric 
data collection privileges may turn into a negotiating sticking point for 
free agents and become a blemish on the record of a player seeking an 
extension with his current club.143  Due to the flexibility of the UPC, 
agents negotiating on behalf of players have the creative liberty to 
request, for instance, opt-out clauses that the player can elect midway 
through a long-term deal.144  Analysts, in comparing contracts, have 
roughly estimated how much such an opt-out clause or a no-trade clause 
is worth to a player.145  Agreeing to wearing data-collecting devices 
might be the next item in the UPC to receive a price tag, whereby a team 
could “purchase” from the athlete the right to require the use of wearable 
technology. 
If data privacy is as strong of a concern as it seems,146 it is 
unlikely that a big-time free agent would agree to be bound by a 
wearables provision as part of his contract.  But the leverage that comes 
with being a high-profile star does not exist for marginal “replacement” 
players who, in what has been a slow free agent market since the 
formation of the new CBA,147 may be more willing to exchange their 
data in exchange for more money or a spot in the starting lineup.   
Contracts of all types can be breached, of course, so what are the 
material grounds and procedures for when a professional ballplayer 
violates the terms of his contract?  Under UPC § 7(b), a team may, with 
ten days’ written notice, terminate the player’s contract if the player 
“fail[s], refuse[s] or neglect[s] . . .  to keep himself in first-class physical 
condition or to obey the Club’s training rules; or . . . to render his 
services hereunder or in any other manner materially breach this 
																																																						
143 MLB prohibits use of health information in salary arbitration proceedings.  
See Sheryl Ring, Let’s Fix MLB’s Salary Arbitration System: Changing the 
Either/Or Model, FANGRAPHS (Jan. 17, 2019), https://blogs.fangraphs.com/lets-
fix-mlbs-salary-arbitration-system-changing-the-either-or-model/.  
144 See Jon Terbush, Meet the Opt-Out Clause: A Baseball Player's Best Friend, 
THE WEEK (Jan. 22, 2014), https://theweek.com/articles/452507/meet-optout-
clause-baseball-players-best-friend (illustrating the effects of the opt-out clause 
with pitcher Masahiro Tanaka’s contract with the Yankees). 
145 See Ben Clemens, What’s an Opt-Out Worth?, FANGRAPHS (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://blogs.fangraphs.com/whats-an-opt-out-worth/.  
146 See, e.g., Watt, supra note 25. 
147 See Lott, supra note 7. 
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contract.”148  If a contract includes a wearable technology agreement 
between player and team, a team might be able to pursue termination of 
the player’s contract under Section 7(b)(1) or Section 7(b)(3) if refusing 
to wear a device jeopardizes his “first-class physical condition,” violates 
the club training rules, or materially breaches the contract.149 
Therefore, enforceability of a contract containing a clause in 
which the player agrees to use wearables hinges upon the interplay 
between Attachment 56’s Paragraph 2 and Sections 7(b)(1) and (3) of the 
UPC.  Paragraph 2 of Attachment 56 mandates that use of wearables 
must always remain voluntary.150  It would appear that the CBA prohibits 
a player from waiving that provision and consenting to mandatory use of 
wearables,151 while Section 7 of the UPC allows the club to terminate his 
contract on, for example, player fitness grounds stemming from his 
refusal to wear a wearable device.152 What results is a tangle of 
contractual obligations, between collective bargaining and the player’s 
freedom to contract individually with his team.  The subsequent 
uncertainty weighs in favor of the club, particularly in the context of 
“replaceable” players who might not be able to find employment without 
waiving their wearables protection. 
Attachment 56 also affects players who have not yet entered free 
agency and are seeking an extension from their current team.  Generally 
speaking, long-term deals with players before free agency are often seen 
as team-friendly.153  Intuitively, without multiple suitors bidding for a 
player’s service, his final price will likely be lower.  Attachment 56, 
however, gives the team additional leverage in these extension 
negotiations.  If a player has in fact agreed to use wearables, then the 
player’s club is aware of his biometric health history.154  The extra data 
may drive down the length or salary of the offered extension, as teams 
can point to any information gleaned from the devices as a reason to be 
wary of keeping the player over the long run.  Attachment 56’s deletion 
																																																						
148 CBA, supra note 21, at appx. A, sec. 7.(b). 
149 See id. at secs. 7.(b)(1), (3). 
150 See id. at ATTACHMENT 56, para. 2. 
151 See id. at art. III; see also ATTACHMENT 56, para. 2. 
152 See id. at appx. A, sec. 7.(b)(1) 
153 See, e.g., Craig Edwards, Mike Trout Leaves Money on the Table Again, 
FANGRAPHS (Mar. 19, 2019), https://blogs.fangraphs.com/mike-trout-leaves-
money-on-the-table-again/ (calculating that the extension signed by Los Angeles 
Angels of Anaheim centerfield Mike Trout, while the richest contract in 
professional sports history, nevertheless underpays his projected value over the 
life of the deal). 
154 See CBA, supra note 21, at ATTACHMENT 56, paras. 3–4. 
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privileges155 do little to fix the problem, as teams would operate on the 
memory of health records or interpret the athlete’s election to delete as a 
red flag.  Lastly, while the player can walk away from the extension talks 
and test the free market, the price offered by his current team will affect 
the player’s free agent market as well.  It is no wonder why athletes are 
hesitant to grant teams permission to collect their data: forgoing privacy 
might also mean forgoing a contract down the road. 
C. Treatment of “Replaceable” Labor 
Finally, while the devices approved under Attachment 56 often 
aim to promote athlete health, they may perversely incentivize teams to 
push players in unhealthy ways for the team’s short-term gain.  Most at 
risk are “replacement” players156 whose marginal status renders them 
most easily coerced into waiving their privacy protections.157  The 
concern here, however, is that they will become expendable rather than 
replaceable.  The example below will illustrate this risk. 
Players and teams all want players to be healthy.  A team 
professes to its players the importance of putting a winning product on 
the field and that maximum success comes for both the individual and 
the team when everyone monitors their health, diet, and exercise.  
Confronted with this pitch, backup infielder X agrees to share his 
wearable data.  At some point in the season, star shortstop A gets hurt 
and X takes his place.  X plays well, but as a bench player, he has not 
had this workload all season.  He starts to feel fatigued but wants to help 
the team and plays through the pain.  Club officials monitoring his 
Zephyr Bioharness can tell that he is pushing himself beyond his 
capacity.  But, so what?  Players like X are a dime-a-dozen, and Player A 
will get back eventually.  If X is injured, they believe, they can easily 
find another like him.  If X does in fact get hurt, and the team withheld 
biometric data showing that he was headed towards injury, what 
consequences are there for the club? 
																																																						
155 See id. at para. 4. 
156 A replacement-level player is likened to a readily-available minor leaguer, 
bench player, or free agent.  See Steve Slowinski, What is WAR?, FANGRAPHS 
(Feb. 15, 2010), https://library.fangraphs.com/misc/war/.  Many advanced, or 
sabermetric, statistics calculate the value of a player by comparing them to a 
hypothetical replacement player.  See id.  The term is not to be confused with 
players who replaced Major League players during the 1994-95 player strike.  
See Dave Sheinen, The Last Replacement Player, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/baseball-insider/post/the-last-
replacement-
player/2011/03/30/AFXoTg3B_blog.html?utm_term=.3253580782d0.  
157 See supra Part II(b). 
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As far as Attachment 56 goes, the answer appears to be none.  
While Paragraph 3 requires the team to give the player a written 
description of the wearable device and provide him access to the data 
upon request,158 they are not bound by any obligation to explain the data 
points to him or to treat the player any differently according to the 
metrics they obtain.  Accordingly, use of this information, even when 
pitched as benefitting the player, falls decisively in the team’s favor.  
Without any enforcement teeth either from within the CBA or from 
outside law, teams hold great discretion for the ways in which they put 
data from wearables to use.   
There may, however, be a roundabout way to provide players 
with more protection by challenging the non-statutory labor exemption 
protecting Attachment 56.  As stated above in the discussion of 
Mackey,159 the three-pronged test of whether federal labor law’s non-
statutory exemption from antitrust liability applies is: (1) whether the 
restraint primarily affects only the parties to the CBA, (2) whether the 
agreement concerns the mandatory subjects of wages, hours, or 
conditions of work, and (3) whether the agreement is the product of 
arm’s-length bargaining.160  Attachment 56, as a condition of work 
subject to the assent of and affecting both players and teams, would 
likely receive the non-statutory labor exemption.  The only exception 
that could plausibly challenge Attachment 56’s protection under the non-
statutory labor exemption would be if, as in Mackey,161 the league had 
coerced the Players Association into accepting its provisions.  However, 
due to the clout of the Players Association and the relatively smooth 
CBA negotiations in the winter of 2016,162 it is unlikely that Attachment 
56 is the product of unequal bargaining.  That said, with the possibility of 
a strike and the observation that the Players Association does not have 
many other bargaining chips,163 this conclusion might not ring as true for 
the next CBA. 
The three-prong test for the non-statutory labor exemption is not 
the only way that federal labor law would apply to the validity of a CBA 
or other contract.  Of particular importance is the duty to bargain in good 
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faith.164  Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act outlines this 
mandate as the duty to “meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms of employment, . . . but 
such an obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession.”165  The weight of the duty to 
bargain in good faith is twofold.  First, while § 8(d) applies to the 
collective bargaining between the league and players’ union, the 
obligations that comprise the duty apply equally well in principle to 
individual negotiations.  In other words, the standards of negotiation 
when the league deals with the Players Association could extend to 
conversations between one team and one player.  Second, should 
Attachment 56 become a cause for dispute in the next CBA, the duty to 
bargain in good faith frames what that negotiation must look like: 
namely, a process deeper than surface bargaining but otherwise as 
unyielding as either side wants.166 
The two greatest obligations under the duty to bargain in good 
faith are (1) that the employer provide all relevant information needed by 
the bargainer to perform her duties and (2) that the employer refrain from 
unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment until 
impasse has been established.167  Extending these principles to contract 
negotiations, a team bargaining in good faith over the issue of wearable 
use should provide the player with the necessary information for the 
player to make an informed decision.  Additionally, the second 
obligation would bar club imposition of a mandatory wearables policy as 
a unilateral change in terms of employment.   
The problem is that there is no requirement in Attachment 56 
that the team explain either the meaning, or its front office’s intended 
use, of wearable data.  The provision that grants players access to their 
own data falls short of the obligation to furnish necessary information 
under the duty to bargain in good faith because players do not have 
access to all information relevant to the team.  But, while that standard 
can inform a solution to this issue, as it stands, this obligation only 
applies between employer and the players’ exclusive bargaining 
representative.168  Perhaps there exists a common law action for 
negligence or recklessness, or perhaps Player X can initiate a grievance 
hearing against the team.  Without affirmative obligations for how teams 
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can treat players who have agreed to use wearables, there will be the 
potential for abuse of those players who are most easily replaceable.  
III. POSSIBLE PATHS FORWARD 
The 2017-2021 MLB CBA includes several provisions that harm 
player interests either explicitly or implicitly.  Currently, given the 
chilled enthusiasm for free agents over the past few offseasons, some of 
the most visible examples of anti-player provisions relate to the luxury 
tax169 or draft pick compensation,170 both of which make signing a free 
agent riskier.  However, where concerns over wearable data ownership 
and privacy do not even scratch the surface, Attachment 56 has the 
potential to hurt player interests in several key ways.  This Note 
identifies three additional risks in Attachment 56: information 
asymmetry between teams when trading players, disadvantages for sub-
elite players in free agent contract and contract extension negotiations 
with teams, and neglectful treatment by teams of “replaceable” players 
sharing wearable data.   
The theme running through these identified concerns is one of 
undue leverage.  When the Seattle Mariners traded James Paxton to the 
New York Yankees, only his former team in the position of dealer had 
access to his wearable data, giving them a leg up in the negotiation.  Free 
agents who are not drawing as much interest as expected may be coerced 
by teams into sharing biometric data, which down the road can adversely 
alter the landscape of the offers they receive from this team and the rest 
of the league.  The replaceable Player X, in an effort to stick with his 
team, signs his body away in a system that presently does not have the 
teeth to prevent teams from running a fatiguing athlete into the ground.   
Law outside of the CBA and UPC does not seem to offer many 
solutions.  Baseball holds its antitrust immunity and, with Attachment 56 
likely being the product of arm’s length negotiation rather than coercion, 
the non-statutory exemption of labor law further shields the terms.  
Looking ahead to the storm clouds of a strike before the next CBA 
negotiations in 2021, what possible avenues can the Players Association 
take if they also identify the above risks in Attachment 56? 
Regarding trades, the players are not directly affected adversely 
by the inability to share data collected from wearables.  Indeed, even for 
teams, it is a zero-sum game: the Mariners may have traded away an 
injured asset to an unsuspecting team, but their next transaction might 
see them being dealt a player with injury risks known only to the selling 
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team.  Sharing biometric data as part of health records would be good for 
team transparency, but it might also heighten the privacy risks currently 
frightening players away from wearables.  But, in the realm of contract 
negotiations, the players have a more direct investment in the outcome 
and some creative options to take. 
Naturally, players can demand more protections from coercion 
within the CBA.  These future provisions could include automatic 
deletion of biometric data, a clearer resolution to the interplay between 
individual contracts and the CBA, and the right to have biometric data 
compared and interpreted for them on a regular basis to ensure an 
informed decision to use wearables.  More interesting, however, the 
Players Association could follow the lead of the NFL and its athletes’ 
Players Association and consider monetizing their data.171  At present, 
Attachment 56 prohibits the commercialization of any data collected by 
approved wearables pursuant to the CBA.172  While monetization would 
be a radical step towards fewer protections for players, the potential for 
economic gains as sports betting accelerates the demand for information 
could turn the tide in the favor of maximal public disclosure.173   
As the first major foray of professional sports into the wearable 
field, Attachment 56 takes a cautious approach but leaves confusion in its 
wake.  The Players Association fixated on protecting the privacy of its 
clients, but in doing so, they strengthened the bargaining position of 
teams.  Wearable technology continues to develop rapidly, and what are 
bioharnesses today might be microchips embedded in a player’s body 
tomorrow.174  The potential for these devices to help keep athletes 
uninjured and performing optimally on the field is immense, but only if 
the players themselves can feel comfortable using the technology.  In 
baseball, it will take more than alleviating data privacy concerns for 
ballplayers to sleep easy––WHOOP Strap or not. 
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